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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the effects of fiscal policy in Spain analysed in a VAR context. 
Fiscal shocks are found to have small, though significant, effects on GDP, private 
consumption, private investment, interest rates and prices. The pattern of responses and the 
multipliers obtained seem to accord with some recent pieces of empirical evidence in 
several cases, while observing some counterintuitive responses in others. Shocks to 
different readings of spending or taxes yield divergent profiles of responses. When the 
sample is restricted to the 1990s a different pattern of responses to fiscal shocks is 
observed, with GDP and interest rate responses being non-significant.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Fiscal policy has traditionally been considered as a powerful as well as a dangerous 
economic tool to smooth cyclical fluctuations. The existing lags between the approval of 
measures, their practical implementation and the time in which they take effect lead to the 
fact that cyclical conditions may have changed substantially in the meantime. Thus, a 
policy measure that could have seemed quite apposite under some specific circumstances 
may no longer be accurate after several quarters. Therefore, the use of discretionary fiscal 
policy to dampen cyclical fluctuations is, at best, controversial.  
    In addition, we know surprisingly little about the effects of fiscal policy. Much more 
dispersion of beliefs than in the case of monetary policy appears to exist among economists 
about the sign and size of its effects. In this respect, the identification of fiscal shocks has 
not received as much attention as the study of the effects of monetary policy shocks (see for 
instance Bernanke and Mihov, 1998, and Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). One possible 
explanation could be the lack of necessary data at high enough frequency. However, some 
recent pieces of empirical research on this field, mainly for the US economy, can be found. 
    Edelberg et al. (1998), Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Burnside et al. (1999) argue 
against using VAR based innovations as measures of fiscal policy shifts and suggest using 
dummies for three military build-ups as exogenous fiscal shocks. These episodes are those 
considered by Ramey and Shapiro. Mountford and Uhlig (2002) follow a different 
approach and identify fiscal shocks from VAR residuals by imposing sign restrictions on 
the impulse responses instead of contemporaneous restrictions. However, this approach 
might lead to misleading results since recent literature on “non-Keynesian effects” of fiscal 
policy may offer theoretical explanations for some facts, e.g. positive output responses to 
tax increases under specific circumstances. Under these, fiscal consolidations might bring 
about expansionary effects on output. 
    Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify a baseline VAR containing three variables: 
government spending, net taxes and private real GDP. The identification of  the VAR relies 
on institutional information on tax-collections and implementation of spending 
programmes, and the contemporaneous response of net taxes to GDP innovations is 
calculated by using information on tax-base elasticities of different tax categories.  
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    Fatás and Mihov (2000) proceed in a different way. They identify their VAR with 
respect to spending in order to avoid modelling the contemporaneous interaction between 
taxes and economic activity, focusing on the effects of government spending shocks. Thus, 
they analyse the responses of different key macroeconomic variables, such as private 
consumption, investment, employment, wages or hours worked, to shocks to some 
government spending components. 
    Marcellino (2002) also imposes contemporaneous restrictions to identify a VAR that 
includes a wide set of macro variables. The VAR is estimated for the four largest countries 
in the Euro Area. He finds non-homogeneous responses among countries along with some 
“unusual” sign effects. In the case of Spain only public investment seems to produce 
significant effects on the output gap.  
    More recently Perotti (2002) extends the methodology in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to 
five countries (USA, Canada, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom) and adds the 3-
month interest rate and prices to the VAR. In his paper, Perotti allows for contemporaneous 
interaction between prices and government expenditure, detecting substantial differences in 
the responses to fiscal shocks between the cases in which prices affect government 
expenditure within the quarter and do not. Moreover, he collects evidence about the size of 
the multipliers having reduced markedly in the last twenty years. In addition, some 
“counter-intuitive” responses compared with the Keynesian paradigm are found in several 
cases.  
    Some of the “counterfactual” results obtained in the latter case find both theoretical and 
empirical support in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina et al. (1999), collecting 
evidence on “non-Keynesian” effects of fiscal policy in a panel of OECD countries 
covering the period 1960-1996. They highlight two potential channels for these effects to 
arise. First, on the demand side, the endogenous response of interest rates and second, on 
the supply side, the relationships among labour market functioning, investment and 
entrepreneurial profits are the main channels through which these “non-Keynesian” 
responses could arise. Thus, public spending cuts, notably public wages, tend to reduce the 
equilibrium wage, both in competitive and highly indexed sectors, yielding higher profits 
and, consequently higher investment. In this context, lower interest rates would reinforce 
the response of investment while stimulating private consumption. They also find similar 
effects, although of lower magnitude, derived from labour-tax cuts.  
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    In the context of EMU, the study of the stabilising ability of fiscal policy gains special 
relevance. The single monetary policy leaves Member States with fiscal policy as the only 
single instrument on the demand side to offset idiosyncratic shocks. On the other hand, the 
Stability and Growth Pact has, in some cases, encouraged fiscal consolidations so as to 
achieve close to balance or in surplus budgetary positions in terms of ESA-95. Spain is one 
of the most prominent examples. However, recalling some arguments pointed out above, 
there is not wide consensus among economists about the effects of this process. While it is 
widely accepted that fiscal consolidation helps to reduce inflationary pressures, some argue 
that this effort involves non-negligible costs in terms of growth and employment. By 
contrast, others subscribe to the view that under certain circumstances fiscal consolidations 
may yield positive effects on activity and growth in the medium and even short term, 
stemming mainly from the role played by agents’ expectations on consumption and 
investment decisions.  
    In this respect, Von Hagen et al. (2001) analyse the effects of fiscal consolidations in a 
panel of OECD countries in the period 1973-1998 and find negative and significant effects 
of fiscal policy on output, which are reinforced by the response of monetary policy. When 
the estimation is restricted to EU countries in the period 1990-1998, direct traditional 
effects of fiscal policy disappear and monetary policy does not respond any more to fiscal 
policy. These results suggest that in some countries the “non-Keynesian” effects have 
compensated the traditional effects of fiscal policy. 
    This paper aims at characterising the effects of fiscal policy on a set of key 
macroeconomic variables within a VAR approach for the Spanish case. The main 
conclusions are: 1) Government expenditure multipliers are found to be slightly above one 
in the short term, while negative in the medium and long term; 2) These effects have turned 
out to be non-significant in the last decade; 3) Net-tax shocks often produce positive short-
term output multipliers; 4) Government expenditure shocks yield significant effects on 
prices of the same sign; 5) Net-tax increases yield negative price responses; 6) Shocks to 
fiscal variables produce significant responses of nominal interest rates; 7) Responses of 
GDP or prices may differ significantly depending on the spending or tax component 
considered. Many of these results are broadly in line with the findings in Perotti (2002).  
    The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data and the 
methodological issues related to the specification and identification of the VAR; section 3 
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presents the results derived from the estimation of the model in terms of the impulse 
response functions and multipliers obtained; section 4 compares the present results with 
other empirical studies, while making an assessment of the main findings. Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Methodology 
 
2.1 The data 
 
The baseline VAR includes quarterly data on real public expenditure (Gt), net taxes (Tt), 
real GDP, GDP deflator (Pt) and the three-month interest rate (Rt). As Fatás and Mihov 
point out, “these five variables are the minimal set of macroeconomic variables necessary 
for the study of the dynamic effects of fiscal policy changes”. Gt is defined as the sum of 
public consumption (purchases of goods and services and compensation of civil servants) 
and public investment, whereas Tt includes public revenues minus transfers, including 
interest payments on government debt1. Fiscal variables refer to the whole general 
government sector as defined in ESA-95 and, in both cases, the GDP deflator was 
employed so as to obtain the real values. All variables are seasonally adjusted and enter in 
logs except the interest rate, which enters in levels. They have been taken from the National 
Accounts (published by the National Institute of Statistics, INE) following the methodology 
of ESA-95 and from the Banco de España on a quarterly basis. The sample covers the 
period 1980:1-2001:2. Figure 1 shows a general overview of the period. 
 
2.2 The baseline VAR 
 
The baseline VAR specification in its reduced form can be written as  
 
t
k
i
itit UYBCY ++= å
=
-
1
        (1) 
 
                                                  
1  These two variables have been constructed following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2000) 
and Perotti (2002). 
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where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables (Gt, Rt, GDPt, Tt, Pt). The only deterministic 
component is a constant term. Bi is the matrix of coefficients for the ith lag and Ut is the 
vector containing the reduced form residuals, which in general will have non-zero 
correlations. Equation (1) is estimated by OLS including five lags. The number of lags was 
chosen according to the information provided by likelihood ratio tests and the Akaike 
information criterion2. 
    Since the reduced form residuals have little economic significance in that they are 
combinations of structural shocks, the identification of such structural components becomes 
necessary. Var(U)=S is in general not diagonal because the reduced-form residuals are 
combinations of the structural shocks. The innovation model can be written as  
 
tt VAU =             (2) 
 
where Vt is the vector of the structural orthogonal shocks and DVVE tt =)'(  with D 
diagonal. Therefore, (2) can be expressed as 
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    The system has been identified by using the Choleski decomposition with the order (Gt, 
Rt, GDPt, Tt, Pt). Although there are many other alternatives, the arguments below aim at 
providing some support to the scheme adopted.  
    The definition used for public expenditure allows for setting a1,2=a1,3= a1,4=a1,5=0. The 
readings contained in Gt are assumed to be predetermined within the quarter with respect to 
                                                  
2  Admittedly, the number of lags seems a little bit awkward for quarterly data. However, given the 
information collected by the tests mentioned I preferred to set it accordingly. On the other hand, the VAR 
with four lags did not offer different results from those reported in this paper in terms of impulse responses or 
multipliers. 
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taxes, output, prices3 and interest rates. Before the reaction of the authorities to changes in 
underlying economic conditions takes place, the situation has to be recognised and 
assessed. In addition, the approval and implementation phases also take some time. Thus, 
spending only depends contemporaneously on its own structural shock without being too 
restrictive.  
    The interest rate is assumed to react with a certain delay to output and price 
developments, in that these are not immediately observed. Moreover, the contemporaneous 
response of the short-term interest rate to shocks to net taxes is also set to zero. 
Consequently, the interest rate is only allowed to respond to expenditure shocks and its own 
structural component within the quarter.  
    On the other hand, monetary policy shocks are assumed to affect output, net taxes and 
prices within the same quarter since, in many cases, interest rate movements are anticipated 
and their transmission to real variables is relatively fast. Although the hypothesis that 
interest rate movements do not affect output and prices contemporaneously has been 
extensively used in empirical work (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, Bernanke and Mihov, 
1998, and Christiano et al., 1999, among others), Perotti (2002) admits that “this 
assumption is by no means uncontroversial”. Nevertheless, as section 3.3 shows, the bulk 
of the results presented here do not seem to be very sensitive to this assumption.  
    Shocks to net taxes are assumed not to affect activity significantly within the quarter, 
since consumption and investment plans take some time to be adapted to the new 
conditions as agents will need some time to calibrate the effects of the shock. By contrast, 
changes in activity are expected to affect tax collections, notably through personal income 
tax withholdings, social security contributions and indirect taxes directly linked to final 
consumption. Finally, prices will respond to movements in the rest of the variables of the 
system and thus, all the coefficients in the price equation are freely estimated. The baseline 
model then becomes 
 
 gt
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3  In any case, this constraint does not seem to be restrictive in the present case, since alternative models were 
estimated without it and the results obtained were broadly the same (see section 3.3 for further details). 
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    With this set of restrictions the model is exactly identified. In order to test the sensitivity 
of the results to different identification schemes other alternatives were tried. However, in 
many cases they produced similar impulse-response functions (see section 3.3) to fiscal 
policy shocks.  
    The identification scheme (3’), as far as government expenditure is concerned, is similar 
to those adopted in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2000) and Perotti 
(2002), in that this variable is taken as predetermined within the quarter with respect to the 
rest of the rest of the variables is the VAR. Specifically, Fatás and Mihov (2000) adopt an 
identification of a similar system with respect to expenditure, since their sole concern 
applies to the effects derived from shocks to this variable. Thus, they avoid modelling the 
contemporaneous relationships between net taxes and the rest of the variables in the system. 
The rest of the contemporaneous interactions are left unrestricted in the tradition of semi-
structural VAR literature4. 
    Blanchard and Perotti (2002) analyse the effects of fiscal policy on activity by specifying 
a three-variable baseline VAR5. Their methodology is based on the fact that unexpected 
net-tax movements are due to their own structural shock and to the unexpected output 
responses measured by the GDP reduced-form residuals. The latter are identified through 
estimated GDP elasticities of different components of revenues. The identification of GDP 
shocks is then achieved by instrumental variables estimation of the elasticities of GDP 
reduced form residuals to the structural shocks of expenditure and net taxes. The remaining 
residual is taken as the structural shock of output. Perotti (2002) extends this methodology 
and includes prices and the 3-month interest rate in the VAR. However, he argues that real 
spending should be affected by price shocks within the quarter, in that some spending 
programmes are fixed in nominal terms while others are indexed to price developments, 
                                                  
4  See Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for an application to the study of 
monetary policy shocks. 
5  They include neither interest rate nor prices in the VAR. 
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although in the latter case indexation occurs with a considerable lag. Consequently, he 
imposes a non-zero price elasticity of real government expenditure. 
    Marcellino (2002) uses revenues and expenditure to GDP ratios as fiscal variables. 
Therefore, the restrictions imposed to identify the VAR have, in this respect, to be different. 
Namely, the disbursements-to-GDP ratio is related to contemporaneous values of the output 
gap and interest rate. 
    As explained above, real net taxes are affected by output, expenditure and interest rates 
within the quarter. This can also be found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti 
(2002). However, they use external information to compute the output elasticities of 
different tax-categories. Accordingly, the approach followed here is closer, in this respect, 
to that in Marcellino (2002). 
    Finally, it is worth noting that in the model monetary policy is treated differently from 
fiscal policy. Monetary policy shocks take place when the decision of shifting interest rates 
is adopted. This is not the case for fiscal policy. The decision to undertake a given 
expenditure programme can be announced at a certain point in time. However, the 
programme has to be evaluated and its implementation takes some time. Therefore, there 
are considerable lags between the period in which it has been decided to undertake an 
expenditure programme and its implementation, typically several quarters. Moreover, the 
data only reflect the policy measure once the expenditure has been recognised as a liability, 
but not before, when the measure was really approved. However, it is precisely at this stage 
when we should quantify the effect of a given measure since it is expected to have been 
incorporated in agents’ expectations and thus be affecting their decisions. Unfortunately, 
the lack of data of such characteristics does not permit assessment fully in depth of the 
effects of fiscal policy, at least under this framework, and obliges to take the results with 
care.  
 
3 Empirical results 
 
In this section the impulse-response functions and multipliers derived from fiscal shocks 
are presented. In all cases, impulse responses are reported for five years and the one-
standard deviation confidence bands have been obtained by Monte Carlo integration 
methods with 100 replications. 
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    Table 1 shows the variance decomposition of the baseline model. Both fiscal variables 
play a crucial role in explaining each other. The forecast error of Gt forty quarters ahead is 
mainly explained by itself, by above 60%, whereas net taxes explain a significant share 
above 20% and GDP shocks come to explain around 11%. Net taxes are mainly explained 
by their own shocks (37.8%), expenditure (36.6%) and output shocks (18%). Regarding 
GDP, again shocks to spending (40%), net taxes (22.5%) and GDP itself (33.3%) explain 
the biggest share. Although surprising, the high share of variance of output explained by 
shocks to government expenditure could be due to the increasing spending-to-GDP ratio 
until 1993, linked to the building up of the Welfare State. The same argument applies for 
net taxes. Nevertheless, this issue deserves further research. Shocks to interest rate and 
prices only seem to play a prominent role in explaining their own forecast errors. 
 
Table 1: Variance decomposition in the  baseline VAR 
Percentage of the 
forecast error of: 
 
Quarters 
Explained by shocks in: 
  G R GDP T P 
G 4 91.14 0.04 1.86 6.09 8.87 
 8 82.46 0.16 2.39 13.41 1.58 
 12 73.46 0.15 4.18 19.56 2.65 
 16 67.61 0.41 7.55 20.40 4.02 
 20 64.11 1.06 10.38 20.04 4.41 
 40 61.25 1.55 11.00 22.31 3.89 
R 4 24.23 68.61 0.51 5.74 0.91 
 8 32.84 51.19 0.60 7.37 8.00 
 12 39.95 42.00 1.27 9.80 6.98 
 16 40.13 39.54 1.35 12.38 6.60 
 20 39.77 38.12 1.37 13.96 6.77 
 40 39.88 37.35 1.79 14.20 6.78 
GDP 4 14.15 1.60 81.40 2.57 0.28 
 8 11.75 4.23 76.44 6.99 0.59 
 12 8.77 5.41 79.93 4.98 0.91 
 16 14.26 5.93 73.84 5.23 0.74 
 20 24.51 5.54 60.42 8.98 0.55 
 40 40.07 3.57 33.30 22.53 0.53 
T 4 17.15 5.45 11.07 66.09 0.24 
 8 20.41 4.82 17.75 51.56 5.46 
 12 18.78 6.80 24.51 45.21 4.70 
 16 20.84 6.91 26.47 41.47 4.31 
 20 26.49 6.17 25.28 38.32 3.74 
 40 36.61 4.57 18.00 37.81 3.01 
P 4 3.67 0.18 1.28 14.78 80.09 
 8 15.33 2.64 2.08 13.81 66.14 
 12 26.77 4.31 1.75 10.76 56.41 
 16 36.99 3.35 2.42 8.48 48.76 
 20 43.50 2.75 3.86 7.56 42.33 
 40 42.64 3.90 11.82 6.20 35.44 
 16 
 
3.1 The effects of government spending 
 
Figure 2 shows the responses of the endogenous variables to a one-standard deviation 
shock to government expenditure. This shock is remarkably persistent, with seventy per 
cent of the shock still present after three years, declining thereafter. The effect on GDP is 
positive and significant during the first six quarters, with the peak effect in the fourth 
quarter at around 0.29%6. Afterwards, it declines steadily and becomes negative and 
significant after the 13th quarter.  
    Following the behaviour of output, net taxes respond recording a significant increase 
during almost the first two years, also reaching their peak response in the fourth quarter. 
The response of net taxes can partially be explained by the positive response of output and 
partly to a reaction of the authorities to financing the increasing expenditure. After the 
second year, they decline and this fall becomes significant after 15 quarters. As a result of 
the reaction of taxes the budget balance hardly responds during the first two years, which is 
somewhat counterintuitive. In the third year, however,  a persistent deficit arises.  
    Prices fall on impact but increase steadily after the third quarter, with the peak response 
in the fifth year. This effect is very persistent and also quite intuitive. Nevertheless, it 
contrasts with the evidence presented by Fatás and Mihov (2000) for the US and Marcellino 
(2002), who find negative price effects after a government expenditure shock. Finally, 
nominal and real interest rates rise persistently. 
 
Table 2: Cumulative output multipliers to a government expenditure shock 
 Quarters 
Shock to: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Expenditure (Baseline VAR) 1.14 1.04 0.58 -0.05 -0.83 
Expenditure 
(VAR with long term rates) 
 
1.54 
 
1.55 
 
1.04 
 
0.50 
 
-0.10 
The table shows the cumulative multipliers to a one-standard deviation shock to government spending. 
The baseline VAR contains five variables: Gt, Rt, GDPt, Tt and Pt.  
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    The cumulative output multipliers7 to spending shocks are presented in Table 2. These 
are slightly above one in the first two years, 1.14 and 1.04 in the fourth and eighth quarters 
after the shock respectively, and turn to negative from the 16th quarter onwards. 
    Since consumption and investment decisions are more closely related to the evolution of 
medium or long-term real interest rates, a VAR including bank loan rates with a maturity of 
three years or more was estimated. The pattern of responses was similar although the 
effects on GDP turned out to be larger, with the cumulative multipliers at around 1.55 in the 
first and second year8. On the other hand, long-term rates pose additional drawbacks at the 
identification stage in that they are strongly influenced by more permanent and structural 
factors. Therefore, the underlying reason behind the choice of the short-term interest rate is 
that it basically includes monetary policy decisions and not so much expectations, 
facilitating identification.  
    The short-term multipliers shown here are in line with those found in Willman and 
Estrada (2002) with a large-scale macroeconometric model for the Spanish economy, in 
that they obtain a multiplier at around 1.25 and 1.40 in the first and second year 
respectively, after a shock to public consumption. The negative medium-term values, 
however, are in line with those in Perotti (2002). 
 
3.2 The effects of net taxes 
 
Figure 3 shows the responses following an increase of net taxes. Around 85% of the initial 
shock disappears after four quarters, although remains significant until the end of the 
second year. The response keeps on declining thereafter, becoming negative and only 
marginally significant in the fifth year. Government spending falls in the quarter following 
the shock, although increasing immediately afterwards to reach its peak in the 10th quarter. 
The response of spending is very persistent and remains significant for four years, which 
leads to a permanent deficit in the medium term. This provides further support to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
6  Fatás and Mihov (2000) find effects of a similar magnitude for the US economy, although reaching the peak 
takes more time. 
7  The cumulative dynamic multiplier at a given quarter is obtained as the ratio of the cumulative response of 
GDP and the cumulative response of government expenditure. 
8  The corresponding impulse responses are not presented for brevity reasons. 
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hypothesis of the existence of a bias towards deficit in the public sector size (De Castro et 
al., 2002). 
    GDP falls in the second quarter and increases afterwards, with the peak response taking 
place in the fifth quarter. After that, it declines gradually and becomes negative and 
significant after four years. Consequently, the cumulative GDP multiplier shows positive 
although small values (around 0.43) in the second and third years, turning to negative 
thereafter. When the VAR is estimated with long-term rates, neither the responses nor the 
multipliers differ significantly from the baseline VAR (see Table 3). 
    The nominal interest rate increases substantially in the first five quarters and remains 
persistently above trend9. Finally, prices decrease in the first two years to recover gradually 
and become non-significant.  
 
Table 3: Cumulative output multipliers to a net-tax shock 
 Quarters 
Shock to: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Net taxes (Baseline VAR) 0.09 0.42 0.44 0.20 -0.52 
Net taxes (VAR with long term rates) 0.05 0.39 0.39 0.15 -0.57 
The table shows the cumulative multipliers to a one-standard deviation shock to net taxes. The baseline 
VAR contains five variables: Gt, Rt, GDPt, Tt and Pt.    
 
 
3.3 Other robustness checks 
 
The identification of the baseline VAR has been carried out through a Choleski 
decomposition with the order (Gt, Rt, GDPt, Tt, Pt). However, other identification schemes 
could have been used. The purpose of this subsection is to show that the results in this 
paper are not substantially affected when other plausible patterns of contemporaneous 
relationships are imposed. Accordingly, three different additional schemes are presented.  
    Model 2  is identified according to the following pattern: 
 
                                                  
9  Perotti (2002) and Marcellino (2002) offer mixed evidence on this issue. In the case of Spain, Marcellino 
finds a significant response in the first two years. 
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    As before, the readings contained in Gt are assumed to be predetermined within the 
quarter with respect to taxes, output and real interest rates. However, as Perotti argues, this 
is not necessarily the case for prices. An increase in the GDP deflator is expected to reduce 
expenditure in real terms in that some spending programmes are fixed in nominal terms 
while others are indexed, though with a considerable indexation lag. Thus, spending only 
depends contemporaneously on prices10 and its own structural shock without being too 
restrictive.  
    The key distinguishing feature of Model 2 is that, contrary to the baseline model, the 
short-term interest rate is not allowed to affect output and prices within the quarter. This 
assumption, although controversial, is quite standard11. Conversely, output and prices are 
assumed to affect the interest rate contemporaneously. Note that under this approach the 
interest rate equation can be regarded as an extended version of the Taylor rule. Finally, the 
use of quarterly data avoids prices from influencing activity contemporaneously. The LR 
test rejects overidentification at the usual levels. 
    Model 3 was identified following the Choleski decomposition with the order (Gt, Tt, Rt, 
GDPt, Pt). The difference with the model presented in section 2 is that net taxes are ordered 
before the interest rate, GDP and prices. 
    Finally, Model 4 imposes the following pattern of contemporaneous responses: 
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10  The VAR was also estimated by setting a1,4 to zero but the impulse responses obtained with this additional 
restriction did not vary significantly from the baseline specification. 
11  See for instance Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano et al. (1999) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) 
among others. 
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whose main difference with (3’) is that net taxes affect GDP within the quarter. This model 
is exactly identified. 
    Figure 4 compares the different responses of GDP, interest rate and prices following a 
expenditure shock. In fact, they do not seem to be too sensitive to the identification scheme 
used and are of similar magnitude to the responses reported in Figure 2. Models 2 and 3 
also offer similar impulse responses following a net-tax shock. However, Model 4 shows 
some disparities. The size of GDP responses is broadly in line with that in the baseline 
VAR and the overall picture is very similar, although the decline after the sixth quarter is 
much more pronounced. Despite prices also falling after a net-tax shock, this effect is 
substantially higher and persistent than in the baseline model (see figure 5). The main 
differences can, however, be appreciated in the interest rate response since its profile is 
quite divergent from the other models.  
    Accordingly, the effects on GDP do not seem to differ much among the different 
alternatives tried, whereas price and interest rate responses are testing. Nevertheless, as far 
as prices are concerned, and leaving aside the differences in magnitude, the qualitative 
conclusions stemming from the baseline VAR seem to be robust to the different 
specifications tried.  
    Other alternatives were tried in order to check the most controversial results so far, 
namely the positive short-term GDP response to a net-tax shock and the short-term budget 
balance response to an expenditure shock. Thus, fiscal variables and GDP were detrended, 
for which linear deterministic, Hodrick-Prescott and truncated trends were used. The latter 
intended to capture the persistent increase of both public expenditure and net taxes up to 
1993 linked to the establishment of a welfare state according to “European” standards. In 
addition to these, the VAR was also estimated with fiscal variables as ratios to GDP. In this 
case, the Choleski decomposition is no longer valid since GDP shocks will affect both 
expenditure and net taxes.  
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    None of these alternatives produced results very different from those already reported. In 
fact, expenditure shocks lead to significantly increased prices, interest rates and net taxes. 
Moreover, GDP always increased in the short term and tended to fall after some quarters. 
Shocks to net taxes reduced prices and in all cases led expenditure and short-term output 
upwards. Moreover, shocks to net taxes always showed a lower degree of persistence than 
shocks to public expenditure.  
 
3.4 Effects on consumption and investment 
 
In order to account for the responses of private consumption and private investment a 6 
variable VAR was estimated (Gt, Rt, Xt, GDPt, Tt, Pt), where Xt is the new variable that is 
added in turn to the VAR. The decision to analyse the responses of private consumption or 
private investment is self-explanatory because of their share in GDP.  
    The identification is again carried out by using the Choleski decomposition12 with the 
order (Gt, Rt, Xt, GDPt, Tt, Pt). Thus, the imposed pattern of contemporaneous relationships 
was: 
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    Private consumption and investment react contemporaneously to shocks to government 
spending13 and the interest rate. As they are components of output, shocks to consumption 
or investment affect GDP contemporaneously. For the same reasons as in the case of GDP, 
the Xt component is allowed to affect net taxes and prices within the quarter. Figure 6 shows 
                                                  
12  As in the GDP case, some alternative schemes were tried and all yielded results very similar to the ones 
reported in this paper. 
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the impulse response functions of private consumption and investment to both government 
expenditure and net-tax shocks. 
Responses to a shock on government spending 
Private consumption reproduces the pattern of GDP and increases steeply until it reaches its 
peak in the fourth quarter at around 0.35%. After that, it declines gradually to become 
negative and significant in the fifth year.  
    Private investment falls slightly on impact but increases in the second quarter, reaching 
its peak in the third at around 1.1% and remaining positive and significant until the seventh 
quarter. Then, it begins to decline and becomes negative and significant from the 14th 
quarter onwards. The multipliers presented in Table 4 show values above one in the second 
year after the shock in both cases. In the medium term the investment multiplier is 
substantially lower than the consumption multiplier. The estimation of the VAR with long-
term rates somewhat inflates the multipliers, more pronouncedly in the case of private 
investment, although the profile remains broadly unchanged.  
Responses to a shock on net taxes 
Following an increase in net taxes, real private consumption rises to reach its peak in the 
fourth quarter, remaining significant until the 10th quarter after the shock. Then, it starts to 
decline, becoming negative, although non-significant.  
    Investment falls in the third quarter and then jumps briskly to reach its peak in the fifth 
one, declining thereafter and becoming negative and significant in the fifth year. The 
multipliers in Table 4 are positive for both GDP components (around 0.6 in the 12th 
quarter). However, when the VAR is estimated with long-term real interest rates the 
cumulative investment multipliers become considerably lower and negative in the fifth 
year. The fact that long-term rates incorporate a non-negligible content of expectations may 
be behind this result. 
    The patterns of response for consumption and investment are quite unexpected, though in 
accordance with the effects observed in output. However, the increase in government 
expenditure in response to an increase in taxes may be playing a prominent role.  
                                                                                                                                                       13  Some components of government expenditure are value added produced by the private sector. Thus, a 
shock in this variable is automatically reflected in disposable income of households and enterprises, which is 
expected to influence consumption or investment. 
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Table 4: Cumulative multipliers of GDP components 
Shock to government expenditure 
 Quarters 
Response of: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Private consumption  0.91 1.20 0.98 0.64 0.26 
Private consumption 
(VAR with long term rates) 
 
0.80 
 
1.26 
 
1.17 
 
0.95 
 
0.75 
Private investment  0.93 1.18 0.79 0.19 -0.33 
Private investment 
(VAR with long term rates) 
 
1.51 
 
1.76 
 
1.28 
 
0.77 
 
0.34 
Shock to net taxes 
 Quarters 
Response of: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Private consumption  0.27 0.49 0.65 0.70 0.60 
Private consumption 
(VAR with long term rates) 
 
0.17 
 
0.34 
 
0.52 
 
0.58 
 
0.53 
Private investment  0.02 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.26 
Private investment 
(VAR with long term rates) 
 
-0.19 
 
0.10 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
 
-0.29 
The table shows the cumulative multipliers to a one-standard deviation shock to government 
expenditure and net taxes. The VAR contains six variables: Gt, GDPt, Tt, Rt, Pt and the indicated GDP 
component.    
 
 
3.5 Effects of changes in government spending components 
 
Following Fatás and Mihov (2000), this subsection aims at comparing the responses of the 
key macroeconomic variables considered in this paper to shocks to the different 
components of public spending. Thus, the responses to increases in a) purchases of goods 
and services (Figure 7), b) compensation of civil servants (Figure 8) and c) public 
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investment (Figure 9) are studied. In order to carry out the analysis, the aggregate 
expenditure variable is replaced by the component14 in turn in models (3’) and (4).  
    The induced responses to a shock to these three components are very different. After the 
initial shock, the response of purchases of goods and services shows little persistence and 
disappears in the early quarters, becoming non-significant. Following the initial increase, 
the response of compensation of civil servants moderates gradually, being significant 
during the first two years. Finally, the response of public investment is positive and 
significant until the 10th quarter. It shows a higher degree of persistence than the other 
spending components. 
    GDP increases in the first quarters after a shock on public investment15, with the peak 
response in the fourth quarter. The response becomes non-significant at the end of the 
second year. On the contrary, the GDP response after a shock to purchases of goods and 
services is, in general, non-significant in the short term and becomes significant and 
negative in the fifth year after the shock. The multipliers in table 5 show that public 
investment seems to be more efficient than public consumption items in stimulating 
economic activity. This result is in accordance with Baxter and King (1993) and Marcellino 
(2002) in the case of Spain. The responses of private consumption and investment show 
similar profiles in both cases, increasing in the first quarters after the shock and falling in 
the medium term. Contrary to the other spending readings, a shock to compensation of civil 
servants reduces output persistently. This pattern is also reproduced in private consumption 
and investment. A possible explanation for such effects can be found in Alesina et al. 
(1999). In all cases, as expected, the response of net taxes broadly mimics GDP or private 
consumption’s profiles. 
 
  
 
                                                  
14  This is the approach adopted by Fatás and Mihov (2000). It could be argued that omitting the rest of the 
components of public expenditure, once recognised they are important in affecting other macro-variables, 
might bias the results. However, this is no longer the case here since models that included both total 
expenditure and the specific component in turn were also estimated and the results were very similar to those 
presented in this paper, although the estimates were more imprecise. Given the low number of observations 
compared with the large number of coefficients in the VAR, it made sense to reduce the VAR dimension. The 
same applies for the case of net taxes’ components. 
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Table 5: Cumulative output multipliers to shocks on spending components 
 Quarters 
Shock to: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Expenditure on goods and services 1.46 2.15 -0.73 -5.40 -14.14 
Expenditure on compensation of civil 
servants 
 
-0.84 
 
-2.79 
 
-5.71 
 
-10.58 
 
-20.15 
Expenditure on public investment 2.42 3.40 3.30 2.37 1.35 
The table shows the cumulative multipliers to a one-standard deviation shock to government 
spending. The baseline VAR contains five variables: SCt, Rt, GDPt, Tt and Pt, where SC is the relevant 
spending component. 
 
 
3.6 Effects of changes in components of net taxes 
 
There is a large body of theoretical work on the different economic effects of direct and 
indirect taxation. In this subsection the responses of the variables under analysis to shocks 
on both types of taxation will be briefly studied. 
     A shock to indirect taxes shows little persistence and becomes non-significant after two 
quarters (see Figure 10). This shock reduces GDP, private consumption and investment. 
The reduction is, in all cases, sizeable and significant in the first three years (Table 6 shows 
the cumulative output multiplier, which records –3.9 in the 12th quarter). Surprisingly, 
public expenditure contracts.  
    The shock to direct taxes (Figure 11) disappears more gradually than the shock to 
indirect taxes. The responses of GDP and private consumption are positive and significant 
in the first five quarters, although these become negative in the medium term. The 
cumulative multipliers in Table 6 show low, though positive, values until the fourth year. In 
any case, direct-tax shocks do not appear to have big effects on activity in the short term 
and the expected negative effects arise in the medium term. 
    In sum, shocks to indirect taxation seem to be clearly contractionary, whereas shocks to 
direct taxation do not seem to affect activity significantly in the short term. However, it 
must be stressed that the different effects stemming from shocks to indirect and direct taxes 
                                                                                                                                                       
15  Nevertheless, the estimations in this paper might not fully account for the effects of public investment, 
since some investment programmes with important spillover effects are carried out by State-owned entities 
not included in the general government accounts according to ESA-95 definitions. 
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are counterintuitive. In principle, one would expect increases in direct taxes to have a more 
negative impact on activity than indirect taxes. In addition, the divergent behaviour of 
expenditure following the shock is at least striking. Notably, the fall of spending in 
response to an indirect-tax shock turns out to be unexpected and no straightforward 
explanation is found for it, while the response to a direct-tax shock is in accordance to the 
findings in section 3.2 for the baseline VAR.  
 
Table 6: Cumulative output multipliers to shocks on net-tax components 
 Quarters 
Shock to: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Indirect taxes -2.28 -3.22 -3.90 -3.81 -3.16 
Direct taxes 0.21 0.44 0.04 -0.81 -2.19 
The table shows the cumulative multipliers to a one-standard deviation shock to net taxes. The baseline 
VAR contains five variables: Gt, Rt, GDPt, TCt and Pt, where TC is the relevant net-tax component.    
 
 
3.7 The experience of the 1990s 
 
In the recent years a change in the fiscal policy regime seems to have taken place16. A quite 
remarkable spending-side oriented consolidation process has been carried out, encouraged 
by the Maastricht Treaty criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. It has been claimed that 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidations could, under certain circumstances, involve low 
costs in terms of output and employment even in the short term. Moreover, in some 
countries with a poor reputation for fiscal discipline and high levels of public debt, credible 
spending-oriented consolidation programmes could even be expansionary, in that they 
could help to create a more stable macroeconomic framework by reducing real interest 
rates. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) Alesina et al. (1999) and Von Hagen et al. (2001) find 
evidence along these lines.  
    The purpose of this sub-section is to assess whether the consolidation process has 
involved real costs. Thus, the sample was restricted to the period since 1992 onwards to 
estimate again the baseline VAR (3’). Notwithstanding output multipliers to public 
                                                  
16  De Castro and Hernandez de Cos (2002) provide empirical evidence on this statement. 
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expenditure being higher than for the whole sample17 (see Table 7), the GDP response is 
broadly non-significant, as Figure 12 shows. In addition, nominal interest rate responses are 
not significant either, in line with the findings in Von Hagen et al. (2001). The low 
magnitude of the responses and the less persistence shown by fiscal shocks seem to be 
behind these results and, in comparison with the whole sample, might reflect a shift in the 
fiscal policy regime. This also applies to net-tax shocks that also yield non-significant and 
almost null GDP responses.  
    Therefore, these pieces of empirical evidence might suggest that the consolidation 
process in Spain has not involved significant real costs. In fact, some quarters highlight the 
positive effects stemming from the consolidation process18 and argue that helping to create 
greater macroeconomic stability, the traditional effects of fiscal policy could be offset by 
those derived from the improved expectations. In this respect, lower real rates and inflation 
in the future, coupled with lower taxes, might ensure higher sustainable growth in the long 
term. However, the small number of observations obliges one to view these results with 
caution. 
 
Table 7: Cumulative output multipliers (sample 1992Q1-2001Q2) 
 Quarters 
Shock to: 4th q 8th q 12th q 16th q 20th q 
Expenditure  1.83 1.48 1.50 1.84 1.36 
Net taxes  0.21 0.29 -0.11 0.24 -0.24 
The VAR contains five variables: Gt, Rt, GDPt, Tt and Pt. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
17  This outcome might, in principle, be consistent with the higher effectiveness of fiscal policy under fixed 
exchange rate regimes. 
18  Although not explicitly mentioned, the explanatory memorandum to the Budgetary Stability Law, 
approved in Spain at the end of 2001, makes an explicit recognition of the benefits of continuing further with 
the consolidation strategy in guaranteeing a greater macroeconomic stability and accordingly a stable 
framework for higher and sustained growth in the future. González-Páramo (2001) shows a useful discussion 
on the effects stemming from the consolidation process in Spain. 
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4 Assessment of the results 
 
As noted in the introduction, there are not yet many pieces of empirical literature on the 
effects of fiscal policy. However, in order to provide some perspective, the evidence 
presented here can be compared with some recent studies already mentioned in this paper. 
In addition, some of the results in this paper deserve further comment. 
 
4.1 Government expenditure 
 
One of the most remarkable features of the current study is that following a shock to 
government expenditure real output and consumption increase in the first two years and 
decline thereafter. While the short-term multipliers are in line with the results obtained by 
Willman and Estrada (2002) for Spain, the negative medium-term values contrast with their 
findings. On the other hand, GDP and consumption profiles are in accordance with those 
obtained by Perotti (2002) in the cases of the USA, Germany, Canada and the United 
Kingdom when he restricts the sample period to 1980 onwards. In contrast, the multipliers 
he calculates are significantly lower than those reported here and typically below one in the 
short term, whereas his the medium-term negative multipliers are in line with those in 
Table 2. On the other hand, Edelberg et al. (1998), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside 
et al. (1999) and Fatás and Mihov (2000) show that GDP rises persistently after an 
expenditure shock in the US. Mountford and Uhlig (2002) also present positive GDP and 
consumption responses in the first two years although again with low multipliers, in line 
with the values obtained here. 
    Private investment profiles are similar to those of GDP and consumption, showing a 
close connection between investment and activity, in accordance with the accelerator 
hypothesis. Investment responses are in line with the mixed evidence across countries 
found by Perotti. For this variable, Blanchard and Perotti and Mountford and Uhlig find a 
negative effect after a spending shock, whereas Fatás and Mihov detect effects of the 
opposite sign. Edelberg et al. (1998) distinguish between residential and non-residential 
investment, obtaining negative responses in the former case and positive in the latter.    
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    Prices are found to increase clearly after a spending shock (Edelberg et al. (1998) also 
observe this effect). This evidence, although expected, is important since other studies do 
not find clear evidence on this aspect. For instance, Fatás and Mihov and Marcellino find 
negative price responses, whereas Perotti shows medium-term negative responses in the US 
and Germany and positive ones in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, although in 
several cases these effects are non-significant. Therefore, the results in this paper support 
the conventional hypothesis that contractionary fiscal shocks help to ease inflationary 
pressures. 
    Nominal and real interest rates increase persistently following a spending shock, which is 
consistent with the results obtained by Fatás and Mihov. Given the positive response of 
prices and budget balance deterioration after some quarters, this result is intuitive and 
expected. In contrast, Perotti offers mixed evidence depending on the country considered. 
    Following a spending shock, net taxes also increase in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
Fatás and Mihov (2000) and Burnside et al. (1999). Finally, the persistent medium-term 
deficit following a spending shock does not contradict Perotti’s results19. 
    By spending components, the sharp negative responses of output and its components 
following a shock to government spending on wages contrast sharply with the results 
shown by Fatás and Mihov. In addition, they do not detect significant effects on 
consumption and private investment stemming from shocks to public investment, whereas 
in this paper such shocks seem to be the most effective ones in stimulating economic 
activity. In this latter respect, the responses here are in line with those in Marcellino (2002) 
for Spain. 
    A tentative explanation for these effects could be: following an increase of government 
expenditure (mainly public investment), output, and thus private consumption and 
investment, rise. At the same time, net taxes react accordingly for two main reasons: i) the 
higher is output growth, the higher are receipts derived from higher tax bases, consumption 
and employment along with lower transfers linked to unemployment benefits. ii) in 
addition, taxes also increase in order to finance the new spending programmes, contributing 
                                                  
19  De Castro et al. (2002) find evidence of long and short-term interdependence between revenues and 
expenditure, although in the short term the revenues-to-spending direction of causality seems to dominate. 
Moreover, they find that expenditure shocks yield persistent deficits that only disappear after seven or eight 
years. 
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to moderate the response of output. The response of net taxes offsets the higher 
expenditure, leaving the budget balance barely changed in the first quarters. 
    As a result of higher demand pressures, prices and interest rates increase persistently. 
The interest response could have a double component regarding the time-horizon. Notably, 
the endogenous response of monetary policy in the short term to higher inflation would lead 
rates upwards,  whereas in the medium term the higher persistent deficits would bring about 
additional pressures on debt markets.  
    The higher real interest rates, reinforced by the phasing out response of public 
expenditure would help slow down activity mainly through their effects on investment, 
stemming from higher discount rates and user cost of capital. Moreover, higher inflation 
would erode competitiveness, undermining potential and effective growth in the medium 
term. 
    Although in the short term these facts seem in principle to fit well the traditional 
Keynesian predictions summarised by the standard IS-LM textbook model, the negative 
medium-term output multipliers could be due to both the higher interest rates and wage 
claims as a result of higher inflation, contributing to reduce entrepreneurial profits and thus 
investment (Alesina et al., 1999). This interpretation would be consistent with the negative 
response of activity observed after a shock to the government wage bill. According to this 
view, fiscal consolidations can even be expansionary due to the better prospects envisaged 
by private economic agents (see  Von Hagen et al., 2001). 
    Despite the interest of some results, some caveats should be highlighted. First, fact that 
the endogenous response of net taxes leaves the budget balance barely affected in the first 
quarters, turns out to be quite counterintuitive and contradicts the results obtained by other 
authors. This might stem from two potential sources: On the one hand, quarterly Spanish 
fiscal data have been constructed by using a set of indicators, but they do not correspond to 
official observed series. In addition, the history of fiscal policy in Spain is somewhat 
different from other countries in that the 1980s and early 1990s were characterised by 
rapidly increasing public expenditure and revenues associated with the building of the 
Welfare State20 following the political change that took place in the second half of the 
1970s. This factor could help explain the high share of the variance of output explained by 
                                                  
20  Argimón et al. (1999) provide a detailed description of the evolution of the general government sector in 
Spain. 
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shocks to government expenditure and might be conditioning the responses observed in 
some variables, particularly net taxes. Furthermore, the bulk of spending and tax measures 
are decided jointly on an annual basis. Quarterly data do not properly reflect this issue and 
obliges to take the results with care. This criticism would also apply to most of the studies 
previously mentioned.   
    Another factor, however, should not be disregarded: in the identified VAR a theoretical 
structure linking taxes and output is not imposed, which in principle is the most 
controversial issue as far as the identification is concerned. In this respect, Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) constitute an important reference for further research in this field that could 
help clarify some aspects of the current paper. This will be left for future work.     
 
4.2 Net taxes 
 
Another striking feature of the current results is that GDP, private consumption and 
investment increase in the first few quarters following a shock to net taxes. Although 
contrasting sharply with Blanchard and Perotti and Mountford and Uhlig, these short-term 
positive responses can also be found in Australia, the USA and the United Kingdom in 
Perotti (2002). Moreover, Marcellino (2002) shows that the output gap increases in the 
short term in Spain, Italy and France. As pointed out above, Alesina et al. (1999) and Von 
Hagen et al. (2001) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on such effects. 
They claim that under some specific circumstances such as high or rapidly increasing debt-
to-GDP ratios, fiscal consolidations may have an expansionary effect even in the short term 
due to expected lower deficits. Accordingly, higher taxes would lead agents to expect lower 
interest rates derived from the consolidation process. The medium-term negative responses, 
however, are in accordance with the other studies. 
    The negative response of prices can only be compared with the papers by Perotti (2002) 
and Marcellino (2002). While the former finds mixed evidence across countries Marcellino 
obtains non-significant inflation responses in any of the cases considered. However, 
regarding the increase of nominal and real interest rates there is greater accord between 
Perotti’s and the results shown here. In turn, a similar pattern of response is found by 
Marcellino in Spain.  
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    The increase in net taxes would lead output and prices to decrease. In this respect, 
consumers’ permanent income would decline, although consumption plans take some time 
to be adapted to the new situation. On the other hand, public expenditure increases21, 
fuelling activity. Thus, the short-term positive reaction of output would stem from the 
endogenous increase of public expenditure, whereas the lower permanent income following 
a tax shock would lead consumption down in the medium term. In addition, higher taxes, 
especially on labour, would reduce the profitability of investment projects and 
entrepreneurial profits, discouraging investment in the medium term. This effect would be 
reinforced by the loss of efficiency derived from higher taxation.  
    The budget balance deterioration in the medium term (Perotti also observes this effect in 
Germany) as a result of the reaction of government expenditure was, however, to some 
extent expected. In this regard, De Castro et al. (2002) detect a bias towards deficit in the 
public sector’s size. Accordingly, the interest rate rises permanently due to higher pressure 
on debt markets. 
    So far, the short-term responses do not fit the Keynesian paradigm, since it predicts 
different signs for the output responses to spending and tax shocks. However, this paper 
shows that in both cases output moves in the same direction in the quarters following the 
shock. In this respect, the endogenous response of fiscal variables seems to play a role in 
explaining these signs. 
    As stated above, the short-term positive output responses to a net-tax shock is a result 
already obtained by other authors. Despite some theoretical support provided by Alesina et 
al. (1999), this result is quite unexpected. In this respect, the caveats highlighted in the 
previous sub-section apply here.    
    In addition, no convincing explanation has been found for the different effects stemming 
from shocks to direct and indirect taxes. They could be due to the identification scheme 
used. It remains to be checked whether more institutional-based approaches like those used 
in Perotti (2002) or Blanchard and Perotti (2002) would offer different conclusions.  
 
 
  
                                                  
21  Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Friedman (1978) and Gramlich (1989), among others, offer theoretical 
explanations for this behaviour. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
 
This paper aims at investigating the effects of fiscal policy in Spain. Shocks to government 
expenditure boost GDP, private consumption and investment, with multipliers close to one 
in the short term and negative in the medium and long term. The inclusion of long-term real 
interest rates in the VAR increases the magnitude of the responses but in no case do short-
term GDP multipliers breach 1.6. Despite this, the negative effects after expenditure build-
ups in the long term remain. Increases of net taxes also lead GDP, consumption and 
investment upwards although the multipliers are below 0.45 in the short term and negative, 
as expected, in the medium term. The inclusion of long-term real rates reduces multipliers 
only slightly. As far as prices are concerned, real interest rates increase persistently after a 
shock to either spending or net taxes, while the GDP deflator rises following a shock to 
spending (in contrast with the evidence presented by Fatás and Mihov (2000) for the US) 
and declines after a shock to net taxes.    
    So far the results obtained do not fit the Keynesian view that would predict different 
signs for the output response to shocks to spending and taxes. In this respect, the 
endogenous response of fiscal variables to both sources of shocks seems to play a role in 
explaining output movements. Moreover, shocks to government expenditure are followed 
in turn by net taxes and vice-versa, yielding in both cases higher deficits in the medium 
term. This supports the hypothesis of the existence of a bias towards deficit in the public 
sector size. Furthermore, the negative medium-term output multipliers to spending shocks 
constitutes, to some extent, a surprising result which might be explained either by the 
persistent increase of the real interest rate or by the higher wage pressures reducing 
investment profitability.  
    It is worth noting, however, that spending programmes and tax amendments are 
approved, and thus incorporated in agents’ expectations, well in advance of their being 
reflected in public accounts. In addition, they are jointly decided on an annual basis. 
Therefore, it is possible that consumption and investment decisions have accounted for 
these measures before they are implemented. Accordingly, the multipliers obtained by this 
approach would be, to some extent, downward biased. However, the lack of consistent data 
makes overcoming this problem difficult in practice. 
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    By components, increases in current purchases or public investment are expansionary, 
the latter being the most effective in fuelling activity. However, the contractionary effects 
stemming from increases in public wage spending, although surprising, might be in 
accordance with “non-Keynesian” theories. Furthermore, a different pattern of behaviour 
also arises after shocks to different tax-components. GDP, consumption and investment fall 
after indirect-tax build-ups, while direct-tax shocks yield positive consumption responses in 
the short term and do not appear to exert a big influence on investment. This divergence, 
rather than finding any plausible explanation in the interest rate behaviour, seems to rely on 
the different responses of expenditure, increasing substantially after a direct-tax shock 
while falling after a shock to indirect taxes. However, since no convincing explanation has 
been found for such disparities, they cast some doubts on the accuracy of the current 
approach in distinguishing properly between the effects of both sources of revenues. 
    When the sample period is restricted to the 1990s, the story becomes somewhat different. 
Positive shocks to either public expenditure or net taxes yield non-significant effects on 
GDP. There are two potential explanations for this result. The first is that fiscal shocks 
show lower persistence than in previous years, leading to lower effects on activity. Another 
plausible explanation is that the expenditure-side oriented consolidation process could have 
helped to create greater macroeconomic stability and to improve agents’ expectations. In 
any case, the recent fiscal consolidation process appears to have involved low or even no 
costs in terms of employment and output in this period. Should this be the case, fiscal 
consolidations would not necessarily be accompanied by slowdowns, which seems to apply 
here. Moreover, in this period monetary policy does not seem to react to fiscal shocks, in 
line with the evidence in Von Hagen et al. (2001). 
    Despite the findings above not constituting clear-cut evidence on the possible existence 
of the so-called “non-Keynesian” effects, in that VAR techniques do not help to distinguish 
between different plausible theories that are not contradicted by the data (Sims, 1980), 
some of the results obtained in this paper lead to the conclusion that the presence of such 
effects should not be disregarded. In any case, the evidence offered might provide good 
reasons for reconsidering some views on the effects of fiscal policy. In this respect, the role 
played by wages is an important element that is not properly addressed here and deserves 
additional work. However, these targets go beyond the scope of this paper and will be left 
for future work.  
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    A final word of caution is needed. The large endogenous response of net taxes following 
an expenditure shock and the short-term output increase after a net-tax shock are 
counterintuitive and cast some doubts on the identifying assumptions. In addition, some 
aspects already mentioned related to the data base and the history of fiscal policy in Spain 
may condition some of the responses observed in some variables, mainly net taxes.  
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           Figure 1: Main fiscal and macroeconomic variables
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         Figure 2: Responses to an increase in government spending
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   Figure 3: Responses to an increase in net taxes
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Figure 4: Responses of main variables to an increase in government spending in alternative models
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        Figure 5: Responses of main variables to an increase in net taxes in alternative models
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    Figure 6: Responses of main GDP components
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 Figure 7: Responses to an increase of purchases of goods and services
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   Figure 8: Responses to an increase of compensation of civil servants
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          Figure 9: Responses to an increase of public investment
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Figure 10: Responses to an increase of indirect taxes
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 Figure 11: Responses to an increase of direct taxes
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   Figure 12a: Responses to an increase in government spending. Sample 1992Q1-2001Q2
            Figure 12b: Responses to an increase in net taxes. Sample 1992Q1-2001Q2
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